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DEVELOPMENTS IN LANDLORD-TENANT LAW:
JUNE 2004-JUNE 2005
Barbara McDowell*
Few areas of the law have as great an impact on the lives of District residents,
especially those living in poverty, as does landlord-tenant law. Yet, the Court of
Appeals issues relatively few decisions in this area. In a typical year, for example,
landlords file nearly 50,000 cases in the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Superior Court, but the Court of Appeals issues reported decisions in no more than
ten such cases. (In contrast, about 35,000 cases are filed each year in the Criminal
Division of the Superior Court, and the Court of Appeals issues reported decisions in about 100 such cases.)1 A number of factors may account for the small
number of landlord-tenant decisions coming out of the Court of Appeals, including the shortage of civil legal services lawyers to handle landlord-tenant cases at
the trial and appellate 2 levels and the frequency with which such cases are concluded by settlements.
This article discusses significant decisions of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in the area of landlord-tenant law between June 2004 and June 2005.
Some of those decisions arose out of landlords' suits to recover possession of
property. Others arose out of decisions of the Rental Housing Commission on
tenants' petitions challenging rent increases and other landlord actions. Still
others arose out of civil suits by tenants against landlord, asserting claims such as
wrongful eviction, invasion of privacy, or denial of tenants' statutory opportunity
to purchase. This review does not purport to be exhaustive. It does, however,
attempt to identify some decisions from the relevant period that may prove to
have continuing ramifications for landlords and tenants in the District of
Columbia.

* B.A., George Washington University; J.D., Yale Law School; Director, Appellate Advocacy
Project, Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia. The views expressed in this article are not
necessarily those of the author's organization.
1 District of Columbia Courts, District of Columbia Courts 2005 Annual Report 61 (2005), available at http://www.dccourts.gov/dccourts/docs/DCC2005AnnualReport.pdf (filing numbers are based
on averages of activity from 2001-2005 as appear in the Report). The reported decisions figures are
based on the author's review of the Court of Appeals' decisions on the LEXIS database.
2 D.C. Bar Public Service Activities Corporation Landlord Tenant Task Force, Final Report 5
(August 1998) (noting that, although landlords are represented by counsel in 86% of cases in the
Landlord and Tenant Branch, tenants are represented by counsel in only 1%).
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I.

DEFAULT JUDGMENTS IN LANDLORD-TENANT

COURT

In Jones v. Hersh,3 the Court of Appeals provided needed clarity as to when
default judgments may, and may not, be entered against tenants who fail to appear at proceedings in landlord-tenant court. The parties to a landlord's suit for
possession (or their counsel) are required to appear for an early morning calendar call on the initial return date stated on the summons. If a tenant fails to
answer the calendar call when his or her name is called, the clerk routinely enters
a default judgment, as authorized by the Rules of the Landlord and Tenant
Branch.4
In this case, the tenant claimed that she had appeared in court on the return
date and responded to the calendar call, but that she had waited in vain for the
presiding judge to call her case for hearing and finally left the courthouse after
the lunch recess. She later discovered that a default judgment had been entered
against her. She moved to vacate the default judgment as void, arguing that her
appearance at the calendar call prevented its entry. The trial court denied the
motion. The court deemed it unnecessary to resolve the parties' factual dispute as
to whether the tenant had answered the calendar call, stating that "default judgments often are entered in this Branch when a tenant who answers the roll call
later abandons the courthouse before the case is heard on the merits by the
judge." 5
The Court of Appeals made clear that the entry of a default judgment in such
circumstances is error. "[O]nce a defendant has entered her appearance," the
Court explained, the landlord-tenant court "is 'without authority' to enter judgment against her 'except upon proof of liability and damages.'" 6 Accordingly, if
the tenant had, in fact, answered the calendar call, the default judgment was void.
The case was remanded for further fact finding on that question.7
The Court of Appeals rejected a separate ground advanced by the tenant for
vacating the default judgment: namely, that service was inadequate because the
landlord's process server, after finding that the tenant was not at home, left the
complaint and summons with another adult member of the tenant's household.
The Court held that the process server was not required to make further efforts
to serve the tenant personally before resorting to such substitute service. 8 The
Court, however, contrasted substitute service on another person present in the
household with service by posting, which may be used only after the process service has made a "diligent and conscientious effort" either to "find the defendant
3
period
4
5
6
7
8

845 A.2d 541 (D.C. 2004). Although Jones v. Hersh was decided several months before the
to be covered by this summary, the decision is sufficiently notable to warrant its inclusion.
See D.C. SUPER. CT. L&T R. 11(b), (e).
Jones, 845 A.2d at 544.
Id. at 548 (quoting Jones v. Health Res. Corp., 509 A.2d 1140, 1145 (D.C. 1986)).
Id.
Id. at 547.
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to effect personal service or to leave a copy of the summons with a person 'residing on or in possession of the premises."' 9
In a second case of a default judgment against a tenant, Pelkey v. Endowment
for Community Leadership,10 the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate. The landlord served the commercial tenant with a notice to vacate
on the ground that the contract purchaser of the building intended to occupy the
tenant's premises. The tenant did not move out. After failing to serve the tenant
personally, the landlord's process server effected service by posting the complaint
and summons on the tenant's door, followed by mailing both to the tenant." The
tenant did not appear on the return date stated on the summons, and a default
judgment was entered against him. The tenant later moved to vacate the judgout of town for a prolonged period that
ment on the ground that he had been
12
extended until after the court date.
The Court of Appeals held that the tenant was not entitled to vacatur of the
default judgment because he had not demonstrated the requisite "good cause"
for his failure to appear.13 The Court reasoned that the tenant, who was a lawyer,
had received the notice to vacate and, consequently, should have expected a complaint for possession. The Court also noted the tenant's concession that his mail
(presumably including the mailed summons and complaint) was being forwarded
to him at his out-of-town address. The Court observed that, since the tenant had
not given the landlord that address, the landlord was not required to attempt to
14
contact the tenant there.
H.

WRONGFUL EVICTION CLAIMS

In Sarete, Inc. v. 1344 U Street Ltd. Partnership,15 the Court of Appeals allowed a wrongful eviction claim based on the landlord's having engaged in self
help to remove parties to whom the original tenant had purported to assign its
lease. The Court reasoned that the landlord had waived the prohibition in the
original tenant's lease against assignment without the landlord's prior consent
because the landlord had accepted rent payments from the assignees and had
provided them with keys to the premises. 6 The case is discussed more exten17
sively below in the section on self-help eviction.
9 Id. (quoting Frank Emmet Real Estate, Inc. v. Monroe, 562 A.2d 134, 136 (D.C. 1989)).
10 841 A.2d 757 (D.C. 2004).
11 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1502 (2004).
12 Pelkey, 841 A.2d at 757-58.
13 Id. at 759-60.
14 Id. at 760 n.2.
15 871 A.2d 480 (D.C. 2005).
16 Id. at 495-96.
17 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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In Hill v. G.E. CapitalMortgage Services, 18 the Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff could not maintain a wrongful eviction suit based on the landlord's having caused an incorrect address for the property to appear on the writ of restitution, which had resulted in the plaintiff's not receiving the final eviction notice
before the writ was executed. The Court's decision turned on the distinctive facts
of the case. The plaintiff was the former owner of the property, which had been
sold at foreclosure after he defaulted on his mortgage payment obligations; he
then entered into a consent order in which he agreed to vacate the property if he
was unable to come up with the money to repurchase it. The repurchase date had
long since passed by the time of the eviction.
The Court of Appeals observed that Landlord and Tenant Rule 16(a), which
requires that tenants be sent written notice by mail in advance of the execution of
a writ of restitution, was designed to give tenants "an opportunity to avoid eviction by paying arrearage of rent. '19 The Court explained that Rule 16(a) thus
enforces the protections afforded tenants under the Court's decision in TransLux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp.20 The Court reasoned that, because the plaintiff was not "a tenant who could redeem his tenancy by satisfying a
money judgment for back rent," he was not "within the class of persons for whom
the notice provision of Rule 16(a) was designed to provide protection.",2 ' For that
reason, and because the plaintiff's continued possession of the property violated
the consent order, the Court held that the plaintiff could not have "suffered any
injury by his failure to receive formal notice that a writ of restitution had been
22
obtained.,
The Court of Appeals' reasoning suggests that tenants who do not receive an
eviction notice through some fault of the landlord may have a viable wrongful
eviction claim if, but perhaps only if, the tenants were facing eviction due to nonpayment of rent and could have arranged to redeem the tenancy under TransLux if they had received a timely eviction notice. It raises questions as to whether
the Court would allow such a claim to be asserted by tenants who were facing
eviction on other grounds, such as violation of the lease, even though such tenants might incur significant property loss as a result of a surprise eviction.
In Danai v. Canal Square Associates,2 3 the Court of Appeals rejected a commercial tenant's claim of invasion of privacy, which arose out of the landlord's
18
19
20
21
22
23

859 A.2d 1055 (D.C. 2004).
Id. at 1057.
54 A.2d 144, 146 (D.C. 1947).
Hill, 859 A.2d at 1057.
Id.
862 A.2d 395 (D.C. 2004).
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removal of a discarded letter from the tenant's trash while it was being held in a
common trash room. The landlord brought a complaint for possession against the
tenant, claiming that she had failed to renew her lease in a timely manner. At
trial, when the tenant testified as to her understanding of the renewal provision in
her lease, the landlord impeached her testimony with the discarded letter. After
the landlord obtained a judgment of possession, the tenant sued the landlord for
invasion of privacy.
The Court of Appeals characterized the tenant's claim as sounding in the variety of the invasion of privacy tort that involves an intrusion upon the plaintiff's
"private or secret concerns." 24 In determining whether the landlord's retrieval of
the discarded letter from the trash room could constitute such an intrusion, the
Court consulted Fourth Amendment case law addressing whether a person's expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, including the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Greenwood,25 which addressed whether a person has such
an expectation in discarded trash. The Court reasoned that, just as the defendant
in Greenwood did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash
once he relinquished control over it by placing it at the curbside for collection,
the tenant did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in her trash once
she allowed it to be collected and placed in the common trash room over which
she had no control.z6
Il.

COURT REGISTRY DEPOSITS

The Court of Appeals held in Arthur v. District of Columbia,27 that the prevailing party, not the court system, is entitled to interest earned on funds held in
the court registry during the pendency of a case. That decision may have ramifications for landlord-tenant cases in which protective orders have been entered requiring the tenant to pay rent into the registry as security for the landlord.
In Arthur, after a dispute arose between private parties as to which of them
was entitled to proceeds from the sale of a house, the funds were placed in the
registry of the Superior Court while the parties' competing claims were adjudicated.2 8 The case languished for more than a decade, during which the deposited
funds were transferred, without notice to the parties, from the court registry to
the District of Columbia Treasury. When the parties reactivated the case in the
mid-1990s, they asserted claims to the interest earned on the deposit during the
24 Id. at 399-400 (quoting Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1217 (D.C. 1989)).
25 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
26 Danai, 862 A.2d at 403.
27 857 A.2d 473 (D.C. 2004). The author was co-counsel for the appellant in the appellate proceedings in this case.
28 Id. at 476.
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intervening years. The District of Columbia, however, maintained that2 9it was not
required to return any interest. The trial court ruled for the District.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The
Court recognized that a prevailing party's entitlement to interest earned on a
court registry deposit was established in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.

Beckwith, 30 in which the Supreme Court explained that "any interest on an interpleaded and deposited fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those
who are ultimately to be the owners of the principal., 31 Accordingly, the Court
explained that the District is constrained by the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause from retaining "net" interest earned on registry deposits - that is, interest
in excess of that required to administer the deposits. The Court remanded the
case for consideration of what interest, if any, was earned on the registry deposit
in the case, what costs were incurred by the courts or the District in administering
the deposit, and "whether the
District had a fiduciary duty to see that interest
32
was earned and computed."
As the Court of Appeals recognized, the Superior Court issued an Administrative Order in 1994 that provides that "[i]nterest income from amounts held in the
registry is used to offset various bank service charges and to provide revenue for
the District of Columbia's General Fund." 33 Further, the interest income is not
paid to the parties to a case except in "extraordinary circumstances where a large
sum is to be held by the Court for a reasonably long period of time" and advance
approval is obtained from the Chief Judge. 34 The practice reflected in that Administrative Order appears to be in some tension with the rule announced in
Arthur. To the extent that the registry deposits in a given case earn interest in
excess of "bank service charges" and related administrative costs, Arthur suggests
that the interest belongs to the party who recovers the principal amount of the
deposit, not to the District of Columbia or the court itself.
In Pinzon v. A&G Properties,35 the Court of Appeals rejected the claim of a
commercial tenant that he was entitled to a refund of his protective order payments into the court registry because the landlord had undertaken construction
that prevented the tenant from using a portion of the premises. The Court held
that the tenant was asserting something in the nature of a "Javins defense" - i.e.,
36
a defense to non-payment of rent based on the uninhabitability of the premises
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 476-78.
449 U.S. 155 (1980).
Arthur, 857 A.2d at 491 (quoting Webb's, 449 U.S. at 162).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 492 (quoting Super. Ct. Administrative Order No. 94-26).
Id.
874 A.2d 347 (D.C. 2005).
Id. at 350-51; Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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- which is available only to residential tenants. 37 The Court stated that the tenant's appropriate remedy would be a claim for breach of contract in a separate
civil action. 38 The Court added that, even if a Javins defense were available in the
commercial context, the tenant could not assert such a defense in the circumstances of this case because the landlord's claim for possession was based not on
39
non-payment of rent, but on the expiration of the lease term.
IV.

RENTAL HOUSING COMMISSION

The Court of Appeals reviewed several notable decisions of the Rental Housing Commission arising out of tenants' administrative challenges to rent increases
and other adverse actions taken by their landlords.
One such case upheld the Commission's ruling that, if a landlord fails to perfect a rent ceiling adjustment in a timely manner, the landlord forfeits the adjustment. In Sawyer Property Management v. District of Columbia Rental Housing

Commission,40 after a tenant on a fixed disability income was subjected to a
twenty percent increase in her rent, she filed a petition challenging the increase as
contrary to the District's rent control laws. The Commission disallowed the rent
increase in its entirety. 41 The Commission reasoned that, although the landlord
had been eligible for various upward adjustments in the rent ceiling for the tenant's apartment that could have permitted the challenged rent increase, the landlord had not complied with the Commission's procedural requirements for
obtaining those adjustments.4 2
In affirming the Commission, the Court of Appeals explained that "the principal protections for tenants" under the rent control laws are "the imposition of a
rent ceiling and the prohibition against upward adjustment of that ceiling except
on specifically enumerated grounds," such as a generally applicable adjustment
allowed annually for inflation and, if a unit changes hands, a vacancy adjustment.43 Under regulations promulgated by the Commission, a landlord must
"perfect" a rent ceiling adjustment by petitioning for, or reporting its election to
take, the adjustment in a timely manner. 44 With respect to the inflation adjustment, which the Commission calculates and publishes each year with a May 1
effective date, a landlord must file a certificate of election within thirty days after
37 Pinzon, 874 A.2d at 351-52.
38 Id. at 352.
39 Id.
40 877 A.2d 96, 101 (D.C. 2005).
41 Id.
42 In 2006, the District of Columbia Council enacted a substantial revision of the rent control
law referred to in the text. See Rent Control Reform Amendment Act of 2006, D.C. Law 16-145
(2006).
43 Id. at 103 (quoting Winchester Van Buren Tenants Ass'n v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 550
A.2d 51, 55 (D.C. 1985)).
44 See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 14 §§ 4200.5, 4204.9, 4204.10 (2004).
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May 1. 45 With respect to the vacancy adjustment, a landlord must file a certificate
of election within thirty days after the vacancy occurs. 46 The Court held that the
Commission's requirement that, in order for a landlord to take advantage of an
authorized adjustment in the rent ceiling, the landlord must file a timely election
is reasonable and consistent with the governing statute. The Court observed that
the requirement "facilitates the administration of rent control" by "enabling the
Rent Administrator and affected tenants to ascertain the true applicable rent
ceiling for any rental unit, determine whether any change in that rent ceiling is
permitted and properly computed, and confirm that any rent increase is based on
47
a rent ceiling adjustment that is authorized and available for implementation.
In another case seeking review of an order of the Rental Housing Commission, the Court of Appeals addressed the mens rea that must be established in
order to impose a civil fine on a landlord who violates the Rental Housing Act by
retaliating against tenants for engaging in protected activity, such as organizing,
complaining to authorities, or withholding rent to force the repair of unsafe or
who "willfully"
unsanitary housing conditions.4 8 The Act provides that a landlord
49
$5,000.
to
up
of
fine
a
to
subject
is
retaliation
such
engages in
In Miller v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission,50 the Court of

Appeals upheld the Commission's construction of that term as meaning that the
landlord must have acted "with intent to violate the Act or at least with awareness that this will be the outcome.,, 5 1 The Court remanded for further proceedings because, although the administrative law judge had found that the landlord
retaliated against a tenant by starting to enforce its "no dogs" policy against him
only after he joined a tenant organization, the judge had not made findings as to
whether the landlord had done so with the requisite willfulness.5 2 In a concurring
opinion, Judge Schwelb observed that the administrative law judge's findings that
the landlord "allowed [the tenant] to have a dog when he was not a member of a
tenant organization, but told him to get rid of the dog after he joined the organia reasonable inference that [the landlord's]
zation, would surely at least permit
'53
retaliatory action was willful."

45
A.2d 51
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Sawyer, 877 A.2d at 104 (citing D.C. MUN. REGS tit. 14 § 4204.10 and Ayers v. Landow, 666
(D.C. 1995)).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 103-04.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3505.01 (2004).
See id. § 42-3509.01(b) (2004).
870 A.2d 556 (D.C. 2005).
Id. at 559.
Id. at 559-60 n.1.
Id. at 560 (Schwelb, J., concurring).
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Although a tenant ordinarily must challenge a rent increase within three years
after it has taken effect,54 the Rental Housing Commission allowed a tenant to
seek relief outside that period in what it described as a "unique set of facts," and
the Court of Appeals affirmed in Majerle Management, Inc. v. Districtof Columbia Rental Housing Commission.5 5 There, the landlord sent a notice to the tenant,

who had been paying $250 a month in rent for the previous two years, stating that
the rent ceiling for her unit was to be increased from $228 to $240; the notice also
stated that the tenant "may have been overcharged on your rent account" in the
past. The landlord subsequently sought a rent ceiling adjustment from the Commission, acknowledging that the presently applicable rent ceiling was $228.
More than a year later, and more than three years after the rent was raised to
$250, the tenant filed a rent overcharge claim. In allowing the claim, the Commission and the Court focused on the landlord's admissions, within three years of
that rent increase, that the rent ceiling for the unit was $228. "Thus," the Court
explained, "within three years of its imposition, the housing provider, in effect,
repudiated the validity of its $250 rent level previously imposed and explicitly
acknowledged that the correct rent ceiling was" $228.56 In such circumstances,
said the Court, the Commission reasonably rejected the landlord's contention
that "$250 became ipso facto the recent ceiling upon [the tenant's] failure to chal57
lenge that rent level within three years."
V.

TENANT OPPORTUNITY TO PURCHASE

The extent of a landlord's statutory obligation to give tenants an opportunity
to purchase their apartment building has been a continuing subject of controversy
within the political branches of the District government. In Columbia Plaza Tenants' Ass'n v. Columbia Plaza Ltd. Partnership,58 the Court of Appeals consid-

ered whether that obligation was triggered by an agreement under which George
Washington University acquired a minority interest in the Columbia Plaza Apartments, a complex in which the University houses many students and faculty.
Under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act,59 the "owner of a housing
accommodation" is required to "give the tenant an opportunity to purchase the
accommodation" before selling it to a third party. The Act, as amended, defines a
"sale" to include a "master lease" that contains one or more specified features,
such as the owner's relinquishing possession of the property to the lessee, the
owner's extending to the lessee an option to purchase the property or an owner54
55
56
57
58
59

See D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3502.06(e) (2004).
866 A.2d 41, 42 (D.C. 2004).
Id. at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
869 A.2d 329 (D.C. 2005).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-3404.02 (2004).
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ship interest in the property, or the owner's assigning its rights and interests in
contracts relating to the property to the lessee.6 °
In Columbia Plaza, the Court of Appeals held that the agreement at issue was
not, as the Tenants' Association maintained, a "master lease" within the meaning
of the Act. The Court reasoned that no change of possession had occurred, given
that the complex remained in the hands of the Partnership, in which the University had acquired only a minority interest as a limited partner. 61 The Court further reasoned that, although the agreement at issue authorized the University to
designate its students and faculty for vacant units and to instruct the Partnership
to evict students who ceased to be in good standing or engaged in misconduct, the
agreement did not give the University control over the apartment complex. 62 Finally, the Court reasoned that the agreement did not give the University an option to purchase an ownership interest in the property, but merely gave the
University a right of first offer if the owners of certain limited partnership interests elected to sell.6 3

Finally, although a division of the Court of Appeals issued a potentially significant decision in 2004 on a landlord's duty under the federal Fair Housing Act to
provide reasonable accommodation to tenants with disabilities, the full Court vacated the decision and ordered rehearing en banc. 64 The decision of the en banc
Court was issued after the period covered by this summary.6 5
Vl.

THE COURT OF APPEALS RECOGNIZES THAT LANDLORDS

CANNOT

ENGAGE IN SELF-HELP EVICTION So LONG AS "SOME SORT OF
TENANCY" EXISTS

It is settled law in the District of Columbia that a landlord no longer may
employ the common-law right of self-help to evict a tenant, whether from residential or commercial property. The Court of Appeals has reasoned that, when
Congress created a summary judicial process to enable a landlord to reacquire
possession of property, Congress necessarily abrogated the landlord's right of self
60 See id. § 42-3404.02 (b), (c).
61 Columbia Plaza Tenants' Ass'n, 869 A.2d at 336-37.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 337.
64 Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 849 A.2d 951 (D.C. 2004), vacated and rehearing en banc
granted, 855 A.2d 1126 (D.C. 2004).
65 Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., No. 02-CV-711, 2005 D.C. App. LEXIS 515 (D.C. Oct. 13,
2005). The author was co-counsel for the appellant in the en banc proceedings in the case. See the
following article, Developments in Landlord-Tenant Law: 2005-2006 for further discussion of the
Douglas case.
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help.66 Accordingly, a landlord cannot unilaterally evict tenants by, for example,
changing the locks or removing their personal possessions.
Questions continue to arise, however, about the legality of self-help outside
the prototypical landlord-tenant relationship, including situations in which the
original tenant has assigned or sublet his leasehold interest to a third party. The
Court of Appeals recently addressed such questions in Sarete, Inc. v. 1344 U
Street Limited Partnership.67 The Court's decision identifies various factors - such
as a landlord's acceptance of rent from, and provision of keys to, an assignee or
sublessee - that may establish enough of a landlord-tenant relationship to bar a
self-help eviction.
A.
As the Court of Appeals noted, Sarete was "not a straightforward case."' 68 The
facts, somewhat simplified, are these: The defendant landlord leased commercial
premises to the original tenant for use as a restaurant. The landlord's prior consent was required for any assignment of the lease. The original tenant sold the
restaurant business, including its leasehold interest, to the plaintiffs. The landlord
later consented to assignment of the lease, although without having been told
that the plaintiffs had already purchased the business (a fact that the landlord
would later maintain was material to its consent). After the plaintiffs fell behind
in the rent payments, the landlord informed the original tenant that he was "the
recognized tenant" and demanded that he pay the past-due rent. The original
tenant returned his key, acknowledging that he was the tenant and that the lease
was in default. The landlord changed the locks. The plaintiffs requested additional time to pay the rent, and the landlord gave them a key that fit the new
locks. After accepting more than $16,000 in rent payments from the plaintiffs,
however, the landlord changed the locks again.
The plaintiffs sued the landlord for, among other things, wrongful eviction
based on the landlord's use of self help. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled
that the plaintiffs did not have a legally cognizable claim for wrongful eviction.
The trial court reasoned that the parties did not stand in a landlord-tenant relationship because "there was no 'required privity of contract and privity of estate
69
between [the plaintiffs] and [the landlord.'
The Court of Appeals reversed. The Court held, as a matter of law, that the
plaintiffs had a sufficient tenancy in the premises to prohibit the landlord's use of
self-help. While questioning whether an absence of "privity" should be a reason
66 See Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d 781, 787 (D.C. 1978) (en banc) (observing that "the legislatively created remedies for reacquiring possession [of real property] are exclusive"); see also Simpson
v. Lee, 499 A.2d 889 (D.C. 1985) (extending Mendes to commercial property).
67 871 A.2d 480, 496 (D.C. 2005).
68 Id. at 484.
69 Id. at 494 (quoting trial court opinion).
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for denying a remedy, the Court held that both privity of estate and privity of
contract existed in this case. 70 The Court made clear that privity of estate alone
would have been enough.
The Court explained that "[p]rivity of contract rests on agreement, whereas
privity of estate rests on an interest in the leased premises. '7 1 Thus, an original
tenant, who acquires the lease directly from the owner, ordinarily has both privity
of contract and privity of estate. The Court noted that, if the original tenant as-

signs the lease, with or without the owner's consent, the assignee "acquires an
interest in the premises that brings him into privity of estate with the owner and
makes him liable to the owner for the payment of rent and on those tenant covenants that run with the land."72
Although the lease prohibited assignment when, as here, the original tenant
failed to obtain the landlord's prior consent, the Court held that the landlord had
waived the prohibition by its subsequent conduct. The Court explained that a
landlord may be found to have waived a prohibition on assignment by, for exam73
ple, "continued acceptance of rent coupled with knowledge of the assignment."
In this case, the Court noted, the landlord continued to accept rent payments
directly from the plaintiffs, even after the landlord had written to the original
tenant to inform him that the landlord considered him the tenant under the lease,
and even after the original tenant had returned his keys. 74 The Court also noted
that, after the original tenant was out of the picture, the landlord gave the plaintiffs a new key to the premises. 75 Because the landlord had waived the prohibition against assignment and the plaintiffs had assumed the original tenant's
obligations under the lease, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs acquired privity of estate with the landlord.76 The Court further concluded that the plaintiffs
also acquired privity of contract with the landlord once the original tenant returned his keys to the landlord, "thus relinquishing or waiving any right to the
77

leasehold.",

Having thus found that "there was at least 'some sort of tenancy' or landlordtenant relationship" between the landlord and one or more of the plaintiffs, the
Court held that the prohibition against self-help eviction applied.78 Accordingly,
the Court held that the landlord "acted wrongfully in evicting [the plaintiffs]
70
71
72
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74
75
76
77
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 494-95.
at 495.
at 492.

at 495.
at 495-96 (quoting Wilson v. Hart, 829 A.2d 511, 515 (D.C. 2003)).
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without legal process because
'statutory remedies [for reacquiring possession of
79
property] are exclusive."'
B.
Sarete was presaged by two other, relatively recent decisions of the Court of
Appeals that identified, but did not decide, the question whether a landlord is
barred from using self help against a subtenant or other similarly situated individual. Both of those cases, in contrast to Sarete, involved residential property.
In Young v. Districtof Columbia,80 the plaintiff, who claimed to have sublet an
apartment from the defendant, sued for wrongful eviction after police removed
him from the apartment at the defendant's request. The Court of Appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment in the defendant's favor. The Court acknowledged that a sublessor is obligated to the landlord to assure that any
subtenants vacate the premises at the termination of the lease. But the Court
explained that the sublessor may evict the subtenant "only through court process." 8 ' The Court added that the rule against self-help eviction of a subtenant
applies even when the master lease prohibits a sublease or transfer of possession
of the premises. 82 The case was remanded for resolution of the parties' factual
dispute as to whether they stood in a landlord-tenant relationship - even in the
absence of a written lease - based on consideration of whether, among other
things, the parties had an oral understanding with respect to the plaintiff's payment of monthly rent. Notably for present purposes, the Court expressly reserved the question whether, or in what circumstances, a subtenant might have 83a
wrongful eviction claim against the ultimate landlord that resorts to self-help.
Similarly, in Wilson v. Hart,8 4 which also presented a claim for wrongful eviction based on the use of self-help, the Court again remanded for consideration of
whether a sublessor-sublessee relationship had been established. 85 And, again,
the Court "left open the question as to the master lessor's eviction rights directly
against the sublessee," as well as the question whether a wrongful eviction claim
may lie even if the complainant's "occupancy constituted something less than
86
some sort of tenancy."
79 Id. at 496 (quoting Mendes, 389 A.2d at 782).
80 752 A.2d 138 (D.C. 2000).
81 Id. at 142.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 143 n.8 ("For disposition of this appeal, we need not address the rights of [the defendant's] landlord as against any subtenant.").
84 829 A.2d 511 (D.C. 2003).
85 Id. at 515.
86 Id. at 515 n.9.
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C.

The Court of Appeals' decision in Sarete provides a measure of protection
against self-help eviction in cases involving "some sort of tenancy," albeit one
that does not possess all of the indicia of a standard landlord-tenant relationship.
Such cases may include those in which a person has obtained possession of the
premises through an assignment or sublease to which the landlord did not give its
contractually required consent. If, as in Sarete, the landlord nonetheless accepts
rent from the person, in circumstances in which the landlord knows or should
know that that the person is paying the rent on his own behalf, and otherwise
deals with the person as a tenant, that may be enough to bar the landlord from
resorting to self help to evict the person from the premises. If the landlord wants
to seek the person's eviction, the landlord will have to use the courts, not the
locksmith.
To be sure, one cannot confidently predict how the courts will apply Sarete, or
the relaxed notions of tenancy that it reflects, to the varied factual scenarios involving attempted assignments and subleases. When, for example, there are
fewer direct dealings between the landlord and the new occupant, such as when
the original tenant serves as an intermediary for the payment of rent, courts could
have less of a basis to find that the landlord impliedly waived lease restrictions on
the original tenant's ability to assign or sublet. In the absence of such a waiver,
and the privity of estate that would result from an effective assignment, the question would arise as to whether "some sort of tenancy" might still exist. As will be
recalled, Sarete suggests that privity may not be essential to the existence of a
tenancy protected against self-help eviction.
Sarete's protections against self-help eviction may be particularly important to
District residents who are living in poverty, many of whom are challenged by
limited education, limited English-language proficiency, or mental disability.
Such persons may not understand the potential pitfalls of informal arrangements
whereby they assume possession of a dwelling that was leased to a departing
friend or family member, without entering into a new lease or obtaining the landlord's formal consent to an assignment or sublease. The landlord may be content
to treat the new resident as a tenant, so long as he or she pays the rent on time
and gives the landlord no trouble. If, however, the new resident falls behind in
rent payments, or otherwise comes to be regarded by the landlord as undesirable,
the landlord may be tempted to begin treating the new resident as a "squatter,"
"trespasser," or other category of person who may be removed from the premises
through self-help. After all, it would be considerably less expensive and less time
consuming for the landlord simply to change the locks and toss the resident's
possessions into the street, rather than to comply with the Rental Housing Act's
requirements for evicting a tenant for cause. Sarete suggests, however, that such a
landlord would proceed at its own risk in doing so.

